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AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND LAW OF
CORPORATIONS-PART II.
The Relation of the State to the Corporation and the Persons
Composing it.
As an artificial person existing in the law as the subject of
property rights and in its essence differing only from a natural
person in that personal rights cannot be predicated of it, a
corporation cannot be deprived of its rights, properties or
immunities without due process of law; nor can any State
pass any law impairing the obligation of its contracts. These
constitutional restrictions do not, as is well known, apply to
the general rights of property, such as the general rights to
contract, to sue, to buy and sell lands, etc., and such rights,
therefore, so far as such special provisions are concerned,
continue subject to the control of the State; but these pro,Asions do apply, not only to the right of a person to property
vested in him, but also to the right to freely use such
property, as it is in such right of user that the ownership of
the property is found. A corporation, therefore, can no more
be arbitrarily deprived of the right to sell its real estate than
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of the real estate itself, as in either case it would be deprived
of a vested property right without due process of law;
although, so far as these special -provisions are concerned, it
can be deprived by law of the general right to deal in real
estate, excepting such real estate as to which its property
rights had become vested. Similarly, with regard to its contractual rights, not only cannot its actual contracts be impaired by any State law, but it cannot be deprived by law of
its right to make contracts for the use of the property belonging to it, since such latter right is an incident to the ownership
of the property and vests upon its acquirement. An incorporated livery stable company, for instance, can no more be
deprived of its right to hire or sell its horses, than of the'horses
themselves, without due process of law, since the ownership of
such horses really consists in the right of the corporation to
use, to hire and to sell them. It would hardly seem necessary to deal with this question, but that it is apparently often
assumed that, by the very act of incorporation, the state
acquires some right to regulate the exercise by a corporation
of its special-that is-vested property rights. That the State
does often possess such right with regard to special corporations is true, but such right in such cases flows not from the
artificial character of the corporation, but from the public
character of the franchise it enjoys. The State always possesses the right to regulate the use of a public franchise, whether
such franchises be vested in a natural or an artificial person,
and it is this right to regulate business of a public character
usually, if not invariably, conducted by corporations, which is
confused with the right to regulate the business of a corporation as such. A railway as a public carrier is subject in the
exercise of its public franchise to the reasonable control of the
State, but so also would be a natural person vested with a like
privilege and duty.
Irrespective, however, of any such
privilege or duty, the vested property rights of a corporation
should evidently be governed by the legal doctrines applicable
to the property rights of all persons. But a moment's consideration will show that the general property rights of a
corporation are on a different basis. A corporation is created
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when any persons are authorized to act under an assumed
aame; and, in the absence of any special limitation, we find
that such persons are thereby authorized to exercise all the
property rights under such name, but it is plainly within the
power of the State, upon creating such corporation, to fix or
limit such property rights and, as a necessary consequence, to
subsequently alter such rights by proper amendment of the
corporate charter, for a corporation cannot, as we shall see,
be said to possess any vested right therein.
A corporation we have found to be merely the result of the
action of the state in conferring upon various persons the
right to act under an assumed name; if, therefore, this right
thus conferred were abrogated, the corporation would itself
cease to exist; or, if such right were modified, would continue
to exist, if at all, under changed conditions. And,.plainly, this
right of such persons to act under the corporate name cannot
be maintained by the corporation itself, for such corporation,
being but the result of such right, cannot in any way maintain
that upon which it depends for its very existence. The
inviolability of a corporate charter, therefore, if a fact,
must be found in the relations by such charter established, not
between the state and the corporation, but between the state
and the parties to whom such charter is granted, to wit, the
persons composing the corporation. What, then, are such
relations ? The essence of a corporate charter is the bare
right to act under an assumed name. Certainly, in the
absence of any other factors or considerations, this right is but
a privilege voluntarily conferred by the state, and, therefore,
revocable at will. A special power not a common right either
of person or of property, but a power entirely artificial and conventional, conferred simply in the execution of a State policy,
should certainly remain subject to State control. The power
to act under an assumed name thus conferred by the State is
not a common right, but is, on the contrary, a special privilege
conferred by the state in derogation of the common rights of
all other persons and, a piori, public policy, as common
reason would seem to require, that if the State should subsequently determine the exercise of such right to be contrary
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to public policy, that it should be able to withdraw it and
thereby dissolve the corporation.
It is, of course, not suggested that a corporate charter may
not contain *acontract, but what is meant and what would
seem too plain for argument, is that the essence of a corporate
charter, the bare power conferred by the State upon various
individuals to act under an assumed name, is not in itself
and cannot be construed into a contract. Many charters,.
especially charters of quasi public corporations, in addition to
creating a corporation, go further and impose upon the
resulting corporation special duties, and in consideration thereof
grant to it special privileges, which latter may well be said to
lie in contract; but what is to be noted is that such a contract,
even if found in a charter, is not of its essence but is merely
incident thereto. If such a contract be found in the charter
creating the corporation, such charter should be to such
extent protected from repeal or amendment under the Constitution of the United States; but as is well said by Justice
Field, in Stein v. Mississipi, in discussing the Dartmouth
College case: "In this connection it is to be kept in mind that
it is not the charter which is protected, but only any contract
the charter may contain; if there is no contract, there is
nothing in the grant upon which the Constitution can act."
The erroneous doctrine that all corporate charters, without
regard to any epecial contract, are protected as contracts
under the Constitution of the United States, which doctrine is
generally assumed to be established by the Dartmouth College case, is founded partly upon a misconception of the true
nature of corporations, and partly upon the failure to distinguish between ancient and modem charters. It is true that
the old English charters, like the charter of Dartmouth
College, were in form grants, but the reason for this is to be
found not in the peculiar character of the corporation or in.
any contractual relation which the state intended to establish
therewith, but in the fact that the old English charters were
in their very nature grants, not simply for the purpose of
creating artificial persons to conduct commonplace enterprises,
' ioi U. S., p. 16.
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but were grants of political privileges which the corporators
either purchased or wrested from the crown. -These charters
took the form of grants, not because the corporators had a
vested right to act under an assumed name, but because the
object and purpose of such charters, of which the creation of
the corporation was but an incident, was to protect the
members of the corporation, in the exercise of certain privileges,
from the tyrannical interference of not the state but the
crown.
Historically, corporations were chartered for public or,
more properly speaking, political purposes. It is not meant
that they were public corporations in the present technical
sense of such term, that is mere agencies of the state; on the
contrary, there were few, if any, such. But such charters
were primarily grants of political privileges, the corporations
existing" merely as incident thereto. Naturally, therefore,
these charters, being in the nature of charters of liberties, took
their solemn form and were vigorously maintained against the
encroachments of the crown. But, it is to be remembered, that
it was the political privileges and liberties conferred and not
the mere right to act under an assumed name that were thus
maintained. A glance at the old English corporations will
bring this fact out. The first English corporations were
probably the guilds. These were associations of tradesmen
primarily for mutual advantage, but who, in consideration of
certain public duties to be by them performed, had obtained
from the crown special political powers and privileges, often of
such broad character as to practically embrace the government
of a municipality. Historically speaking, indeed, municipalities, as the outgrowth of such guilds, were not as now mere
political agents of the state, but were associations of persons
who, by charter, had acquired the right, in certain respects, to
govern themselves. The charters were, indeed, in many
respects, similar to those of the great universities-to that of
Dartmouth College; but it is not to be argued from this that
these latter charters were, in any sense, contracts. On the
contrary, the only deduction, if any, to be drawn, is that these
:,atter corporations are like municipalities, of a political char-
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acter, and, therefore, according to our modern doctrine, subject
to state control.
The charter of foreign colonies were of the same character.
To encourage the establishment of such a colony, a charter
would be granted the adventurers, carrying with it various
political rights and privileges. Many of the American colonies were thus established; their charters were in form compacts, and the proprietors and colonists, therefore, properly
maintained them to be guarantees of political liberties. Going
a step further, charters were then granted to companies of
merchants conferring certain trade privileges of a political
character. But so far stock companies were unknown; and
the members of corporations merely enjoyed the political
privileges conferred. In the year i6oo, however, the first
joint stock company, the East India Company, was chartered
by the crown. This charter, also, was in form a compact.
In consideration of their undertaking certain annual ventures
in the Indies, the corporators and their successors, under the
name of the East India Company, were granted certain trade
and political privileges. Thus far this charter was similar to
others previously granted, but. in addition this company was
authorized to issue stock and to carry on its enterprise in the
corporate name for the benefit of the stockholders. Heretofore the members of corporations had enjoyed"their political
privileges as individuals, the corporation merely existing for
the purpose of protecting and maintaining them, but by this
charter, as with modern stock companies, all such privileges
were vested in the corporation itself, the members thereof
having only the right to elect the governing board and to
share the profits.
As the East India Company may be said to usher in the
modern stock company, it may be well to stop for a moment
to compare the old with the new corporation. Both are
artificial persons resulting from the right conferred by the
state upon various persons to act under an assumed name,
but otherwise there is little or no similarity between them.
Their charters are essentially different. As seen, the old
charters were charters of privileges and liberties of a more or
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less political character, of which the act of incorporation in
itself was a mere incident, while modern chafters are, as a
rule' mere acts of incorporation, their sole purpose and intent
being to create artificial persons. Old English charters were
considered by the people, although not in law, inviolable by
the crown, because they were of a public character and carried
with them or guaranteed political privileges and liberties, and
not because of any legal doctrine or belief that there was anything in the simple act of creating an artificial person binding
upon the state; the present legal doctrine, therefore, of the
inviolability of corporate charters can find no support in the
old English law or sentiment. On the contrary, the very
characteristic of the old corporations, its political character,
that protected it from the interference of the crown would,
under our present doctrine of public corporations, render like
corporations subject to state control. The doctrine of the
Dartmouth College case, therefore, that charters, as grants or
executed contracts, can be neither repealed or amended by the
State, cannot be supported either. historically or theoretically.
Yet, very possibly, the decision itself was correct. It is to be
noted that the legislature of New Hampshire did not undertake to repeal the charter in question, but merely amended it
so as to change the administration of the College-a very
different thing. And the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,
in sustaining such act, based its opinion upon its finding that
such College was a public and not a private corporation.
But, assuming the Supreme Court of the United States to be
correct in its finding that such College was a private corporation, a very different case is presented. The State having
granted certain individuals and their successors the right to
administer a private fund committed to them for a private
purpose, under an assumed name, might have deprived such
persons, by the repeal of such act, of such special privilege
and thereby remitted them their common law rights and
duties; but it does not follow that the State possessed the
right to transfer this privilege of administering such private
property to certain other persons selected by itself. The
question of the public or private character of this College was
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a fundamental question upon which the State and the United
States courts disagreed; the Supreme Court of New Hampshire sustaining the act in question simply as an exercise of
the recognized right of the State to regulate and control public
corporations. With this divergence of finding, however, we
need not concern ourselves further, except to note the
rather curious fact that, if the Supreme Court of the United
States had but followed the New Hampshire court ini holding
an educational corporation to be of a public character (as it
probably would have done if the case had arisen within the
last few years), it would have been compelled to affirm the
State decision, and the unfortunate doctrine of the case would
probably never have been established. We say unfortunate,
for that such doctrine is unfortunate, is, outside of any a firion
reasoning upon the subject, established by the fact that every
State in the Union has been compelled, as a matter of selfpreservation, to override such decision by constitutional or
legislative provision.
But let us return to the right of the State to amend, without repealing, the charter of a private corporation. In so far
as a corporation charter merely confers upon certain persons
the right to exercise certain property rights under an assumed
name, what has been said with reference to the right of the
State to repeal such act and thereby deprive such persons of
every right so conferred, applies as well to the right of the
State by the amendment of such act, to limit and restrict such
persons in the further exercise of such special rights so conferred, so long as such amendment does not interfere with any
vested property right of the corporation itself. For instance,
a manufacturing corporation could, by proper amendment of
its charter, be deprived of its general power'to buy and sell
lands, provided such amendment did not in any way affect its
right to sell such lands as it might have already acquired or
contracted to acquire, as only in such latter case would the
corporation, as a continuing existing person, be deprived of a
vested property right without due process of law. It may
seem strange, at first sight, that such an act, applicable to the
property belonging to a corporation, would be invalid if the:
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corporation continued to exist, and yet an act repealing the
entire charter and, therefore, necessarily having the same
result, would be valid. The distinction, however, is plain.
In the latter case, the land belonging to the dissolved corporation would become immediately the property of the
directors, receivers or the stockholders of the corporation, as
the case might be, with full power of sale vested in them;
while, in the former case, it would still remain the property of
the corporation, but with the power of sale divested, and it is
in this divesting of the power of sale that the invalidity of the
act is found. Likewise an act amending a corporate charter,
so as to deprive it absolutely of its right to make contracts,
would also be void, since that would be to deprive it, while
still an existing person and recognized as such in the law, of
a vested right with regard to all property belonging to it; and
an amendment regulating the exercise of such contractual
rights in certain cases would also be, for the same reason,
void, unless it could be sustained as a reasonable exercise of
the right of the State to regulate.the use of a public franchise.
It is on this ground, of course, that acts such as those fixing
railway charges are sustained, while, for the general reasons
heretofore stated, they are void, if unreasonable, as depriving
persons of property without due process of law.
It may be generally stated, therefore, that acts repealing
corporate charters are valid, as also all acts to amend such
charters by limiting the powers originally conferred thereby,
provided such amendments are not applicable to vested property rights. It is often suggested, however, that such acts,
either of repeal or of amendment, should be held invalid with
reference to stock companies as impairing the obligation of
the contract between the stockholders, irrespective of any contract between the State and the corporation or any vested right
of the corporation as an existing person. This supposed contract among the stockholders is very commonly referred to by
text-writers and jurists as an indisputable fact and one of the
chief characteristics of a stock company, but, under the analysis
of a corporation here given, there seems to be no place for
such a contract.
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A corporation is but an artificial person existing as the
result of the right conferred by the State upon various persons
to act under an assumed name; the stockholders are but the
donors of the corporate property. Where, then, or in What,
is the contract among such stockholders ? There may be,
and often is, a contract among promotors (who may afterwards become stockholders) with reference to the formation of
the corporation, but upon the formation of the corporation
such contract ceases. There is, also, often a contract of
subscription between the stockholders and the corporation,
but upon the full payment for and issue of the stock subscribed for, such contract is fulfilled, or, in any case, and even
before so fulfilled, it is a contract between the corporation and
its stockholders as individuals and not in any way a contract
among the stockholders themselves. A person may become
a stockholder of a corporation in two different ways: first, by
contract of subscription with the corporation, above referred to,

and second, by the purchase of the stock from third persons.
In the latter case he evidently enters into no contract with
either the corporation or any of the stockholders, but merely
a contract or purchase and sale with the former stockholder.
In either of the above instances it seems impossible to find a
basis for any contract among the stockholders themselves, and
in fact none such exists.
The rights and duties of stockholders, indeed, are fixed and
determined, but evidently not by any contract among themselves, for they need not have any dealings with each other,

but, by law, the fact being that such rights and duties cannot
in any way be affected by any contract among themselves.
The position of a stockholder in the corporation is evidently
one of status and not of contract, and this becomes especially
evident when we consider other corporations than those of a
commercial character. Take, for instance, the citizens of a
municipal corporation, who occupy in many respects a position
with regard to the corporation and with regard to each other
similar to the position occupied by stockholders. Certainly, it
would be absurd even to suggest that any contractual relation
exists between such citizens, and yet there is nothing in the
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status of a stockholder which serves to distinguish him in this
respect from the taxpayer and voter of a municipal corporation. In accepting the charter, or in incorporating the
company, the stockholders do, indeed, fix the status of themselves and their successors, but they enter into no contract
with each other. They one and all submit themselves necessarily to the law controlling the stockholders of a corporation,
but enter into no contract which could be by law impaired,
unless it be the contract of subscription with the corporation
just referred to and which we will now consider. This subscription contract is based upon the charter. The subscriber
to stock agrees thereby to pay the corporation, or, under our
definition, the persons authorized to act as such, a certain sum
of money to be held and administered by them in their corporate capacity for the corporate purposes as set forth in the
charter and, therefore, of course, when such money is paid, it
is taken by such corporation or by such persons in such corporate capacity under the resulting contract or trust, as it may
be put, that it should be held. and used by them in such
corporate capacity for such corporate purposes. There,
therefore, remains in such stockholders and their successors a
vested right in such property to have it managed by such
persons and no others, acting in such corporate capacity,
applied to such purposes, which vested right, of course, is
protected by the various constitutional provisions heretofore
referred to.
The State, therefore, cannot, under the guise of amending
the charter of a corporation, divert such funds from the charter
to other purposes or transfer its administration from the
persons to whom, under the original charter, it was committed,
to other and different persons, for such an act would both
impair the obligation of the implied contract between the corporation and its stockholders, and deprive the stockholders of
a vested right in the corporate property without due process
of law.
It is interesting to again note here that, assuming Dartmouth
College to have been a private corporation, this doctrine
sustains the decision of the Supreme Court in such case, since
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the statute there in question purported to actually transfer the
property of such College from one set of trustees to another.
The only other contracts that might be effected by acts
repealing or amending charters are the contracts of the
corporations with third persons; plainly, an amendment would
be invalid which impaired the obligation of such contract, but
a repeal would never impair the obligation thereof, since the
dissolution of a corporation as is well determined by the
Supreme Court, in Greenwood v. Union Frg* Ry., 1 is in the
law, but the death of a person and such contracts survive
against the corporate successors.
As already suggested, however, a corporate charter is
protected from repeal or amendment, to the extent- that it
contains a special contract or vests property rights. If, for
example, a street railway is constructed relying upon the
franchise to operate the same upon public highways, granted
by the corporate charter, then such franchise is absolutely
necessary to the user of such railway property, and in. connection therewith should be held a vested property right; or
to take the case of a contract, if a railway is constructed relying upon a tax exemption, granted by the charter, then such
exemption becomes a contract executed on the part of the
railroad and, therefore, binding on the State in the absence of
a specially reserved power of amendment or repeal. This
power, however, is now almost universally reserved to the
State, and, therefore, all charters are now subject to repeal
and to such amendment as does not, as heretofore shown, impair any existing contract or divest the corporation of any
vested property right.
The status, however, of corporations formed under the general law would seem to be quite different. In such case the
State has evidently conferred no special license, in its nature
revocable, upon special individuals, but, on the contrary, has
granted to all persons alike a general right which it would, therefore, seem it could not abrogate with regard to special individuals. The State, therefore, should not have the power to repeal
or amend the charter of such a corporation by a special law,
1105 U. S. 13.

AND

LAW OF CORPORATIONS.

77

since that would be to deprive the persons constituting such a
corporation of a right common to all other citizens. Of course,

however, such corporations are not beyond the control of the
State, but, being formed under general laws, they should be
reached by amendments thereof or by other general laws
applicable to all corporations of their class. What has been
heretofore said with reference to the amendments of special
charters by special laws applies equally to the amendment of
the charters of such corporations by general law, and any such
general law which impairs the obligation of existing contracts
or deprives any corporation of a vested property right will be
invalid, although, as heretofore shown, a general law dissolving
such corporations would be perfectly legal.

Henry Winslow Williams.
Baltimore, October, 1898.
(To be concluded.)

